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Commentary: “An Evaluation of
Universal Grammar and the
Phonological Mind”—UG Is Still a
Viable Hypothesis
Iris Berent*
Phonology and Reading Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
Everett (2016b) criticizes The Phonological Mind thesis (Berent, 2013a,b) on logical,
methodological and empirical grounds. Most of Everett’s concerns are directed toward
the hypothesis that the phonological grammar is constrained by universal grammatical
(UG) principles. Contrary to Everett’s logical challenges, here I show that the UG
hypothesis is readily falsifiable, that universality is not inconsistent with innateness
(Everett’s arguments to the contrary are rooted in a basic confusion of the UG phenotype
and the genotype), and that its empirical evaluation does not require a full evolutionary
account of language. A detailed analysis of one case study, the syllable hierarchy,
presents a specific demonstration that people have knowledge of putatively universal
principles that are unattested in their language and these principles are most likely
linguistic in nature. Whether Universal Grammar exists remains unknown, but Everett’s
arguments hardly undermine the viability of this hypothesis.
Keywords: phonology, universal grammar, core knoweldge, innateness, sonority
The Phonological Mind thesis (Berent, 2013a,b), according to Everett (2016b), is plainly silly. It
defends a formal linguistic account that is blatantly false, its experimental support is confounded
by trivial “perceptual” factors, and its biological bases are at best tenuous. The problem, according
to Everett, is not limited to this particular theory of phonology, or even language. Rather, it is an
entire class of nativist accounts of cognition, specifically, the “core knowledge” hypothesis, that is
bankrupt. The Phonological Mind thesis, then, exemplifies what has gone so wrong in cognitive
nativism.
I believe Everett’s concerns are unfounded. Everett’s broader objections to cognitive nativism
are rooted in an erroneous conflation of explanations at the cognitive and biological levels,
an implausible view of the links between the cognitive phenotype and the genotype, and a
disregard for a large experimental literature that counters his assertions. Similarly, in his attack
on The Phonological Mind’s thesis, Everett ignores most of the relevant experimental evidence, he
systematically misrepresents my claims, and his characterization of my approach is disingenuous.
Whether Universal Grammar exists remains unknown—a fact that (contrary to Everett’s claims) I
openly acknowledge. But Everett’s superficial reading of the scientific literature and his incendiary
rhetoric do not challenge this hypothesis.
My reply proceeds as follows. I first consider Everett’s broader critique of cognitive nativism
and address his logical and methodological concerns about the falsification of nativist claims and
their congruency with genetic and evolutionary evidence. Having established some ground rules for
testing the core knowledge hypothesis, I proceed to consider the evidence for innate phonological
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constraints by evaluating the empirical evidence for UG in
a particular case study—the restrictions on syllable structure.
Everett’s remaining arguments against The Phonological Mind
thesis are discussed in the final section. While my reply focuses
mostly on the arguments in Everett (2016a), the broader context
is set in reference to his upcoming book, Dark Matter of the Mind,
of which Everett (2016b) is an excerpt.
EVALUATING COGNITIVE NATIVISM
To appreciate Everett’s (2016b) critique of nativist theories of
language, it is important to consider it within his broader
critique of cognitive nativism, specifically, the core knowledge
hypothesis. My discussion begins with a brief summary of this
hypothesis, followed by a discussion of Everett’s methodological
concerns.
The Core Knowledge Hypothesis
Core knowledge theory articulates a cognitive hypothesis
regarding the origins of knowledge (for reviews, see Spelke,
1994; Carey and Spelke, 1996; Spelke, 2000; Spelke and Kinzler,
2007; Carey, 2009). It asserts that knowledge is constrained by
domain-specific principles that are innate, and consequently,
these principles tend to emerge universally, in early development.
In addition, core knowledge plays a secondary role in guiding
the acquisition of knowledge later in life. For example, young
infants (e.g., Feigenson et al., 2002; Wynn et al., 2002; Izard
et al., 2009; de Hevia et al., 2014) and animals (e.g., Uller
et al., 2001; Flombaum et al., 2005) exhibit a rudimentary
understanding of number based on principles that are apparently
universal and innate. Unlike the early core knowledge of
number, mathematical theory is neither innate nor universal,
but its organization appears to follow on the heels of core
knowledge principles. Other putative systems of core knowledge
concern the representation of objects (e.g., Carey and Xu, 2001),
space (e.g., Hermer and Spelke, 1994), others’ minds (e.g.,
Leslie, 2005) and morality (e.g., Hamlin et al., 2007, 2010). In
all cases, infants tend to converge on narrow organizational
principles that are apparently unattested in their experience,
and these foundations guide the acquisition of related bodies of
knowledge later in life (e.g., mathematics, physics, psychology
and ethics).
Berent (2013a,b) suggests that phonology might present
another core knowledge system, whose organization is
constrained by universal grammar. This hypothesis predicts
that speakers of all languages converge on shared phonological
principles for which they lack inductive basis. To the extent
phonological knowledge is abstract, it is possible for it to emerge
across language modalities—in signed and spoken phonological
systems. Finally, the view of phonology as a system of core
knowledge further explains the close links between phonology
and reading—a cultural invention that is obviously not universal,
but is often phonologically based.
Everett rejects cognitive nativism outright. In his words
“There is no human nature if by this we mean a kind
of a priori knowledge common to all and only humans”
(Everett, 2016a, p. 51)1. “There is nothing like instincts or
modules in our higher-level cognitive abilities, e.g., language,
interpretative principles of the world around us” (Everett, 2016a,
p. 54). But Everett never discusses the details of any of the
many experimental studies that demonstrate core knowledge in
infancy. Instead, his objections (e.g., to a “moral instinct”) “boil
down to three: (i) designer bias (i.e., the appeal to the notion that
“humans are the way they are for reasons beyond their control,”
p. 660); (ii) Ivy league bias (i.e., “assume the person at the most
prestigious university is correct,” p.661); and (iii) simple answers
to complex questions” (p. 660). None of these arguments speaks
to the experimental evidence itself.
At a broader level, Everett (2016b) outlines two classes of in-
principle objections to the core knowledge hypothesis. First, he
is worried that this hypothesis is “difficult to falsify”. He next
proceeds to attack cognitive nativism based on methodological,
genetic and evolutionary considerations. I believe these concerns
are unfounded, and I consider them next in turn. My goal
here is to demonstrate that cognitive nativism, generally, and
phonological nativism, specifically, remains a viable hypothesis.
The specific evidence in its support is discussed in Section “A
Case Study: The Restrictions on Syllable Structure.”
Falsifying the Core Knowledge
Hypothesis: The Cognitive Tests
Contrary to Everett’s worries, the core knowledge hypothesis
makes some clear, readily falsifiable claims. This hypothesis
would be readily falsified by showing that putative principles of
core knowledge either (a) have no effect on behavior; (b) emanate
from extraneous sources, external to the domain in question;
or (c) are induced (i.e., learned) by tracking the statistical or
structural regularities in the child’s experience. In the specific case
of phonology, the hypothesis that a principle P forms part of
a core phonological system (i.e., universal grammar) would be
falsified by either showing that the preference attributed to P is
inactive (1) (a), or by showing that it is neither linguistic or innate
(i.e., it can be captured by sensorimotor constraints or ones that
are induced from experience, see 1b–c).
(1) Falsifying the core knowledge hypothesis. The hypothesis that
a principle P forms part of core knowledge of phonology
(UG) will be falsified by showing that
(a) P is inactive.
(b) P emanates from extraneous non-phonological sources
(e.g., sensorimotor constraints).
(c) P is induced (i.e., learned) by tracking the statistical or
structural regularities in the child’s experience.
To illustrate how one can apply these conditions, let us
consider in detail one specific example, concerning the putatively
universal constraint on syllable structure (i.e., ONSET, Prince
and Smolensky, 1993/2004). To reiterate, my goal here is to
demonstrate how this constraint can be falsified, in principle; I am
not concerned with whether the ONSET hypothesis is correct.
1All page citations of Everett (2016a) are based on a manuscript from August 03,
2015.
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ONSET is a putatively universal phonological principle (P)
that requires syllables to have an onset (i.e., begin with a
consonant). Accordingly, syllables like pa should be better formed
than ap, resulting in a preference for pa across languages, in
language processing and acquisition.
(2) ONSET: Syllables must have onsets.
The simplest way to falsify ONSET is to demonstrate that it is
inactive in a given language (e.g., English). Notice that counter-
examples (i.e., syllables like ap, e.g., ap.pen.dec.to.my) would not
necessarily establish that fact. In modern phonological theory
(e.g., Prince and Smolensky, 1993/2004; McCarthy and Prince,
1995), all grammatical constraints are violable (an assumption
that is independently motivated; for discussion see Prince and
Smolensky, 1993/2004; McCarthy and Prince, 1995), so the
existence of syllables like ap does not necessarily show that
ONSET is inactive. However, one could falsify this hypothesis by
documenting a language that actively promotes onsetless syllables
(i.e., a preference for a or ap over pa). Some authors have argued
that Arrernte presents precisely this case (Breen and Pensalfini,
2001), although the matter remains a topic of controversy (Berry,
1998; Topintzi and Nevins, 2014).
Another way to falsify ONSET is to show that the pa>ap
preference is causally determined solely by the relative ease
of the perception and articulation of pa. The distinction
between a sole direct cause and indirect pressures is absolutely
crucial. Many phonological systems conspire to favor forms that
optimize speech perception and production—this is precisely
what would be expected if phonology were an adaptive biological
system (Berent, 2013a,b). But correlation is not causation. The
Phonological Mind hypothesis states that sensorimotor pressures
constrain the phonological system not in on-line language
processing, but rather off-line, in phylogeny—by favoring the
FIGURE 1 | The hypothesized links between phonology and the
phonetic system. At the heart of the phonological system is the phonological
grammar—a set of principles that are abstract and algebraic (as defined in
Section Other Objections to the Phonological Mind Thesis), distinct from the
phonetic system. Nonetheless, phonetic and sensorimotor pressures shape
phonology in language evolution and its acquisition to favor phonological
principles that optimize phonetic and sensorimotor pressures.
biological evolution of abstract universal rules that optimize
sensorimotor pressures (e.g., by natural selection, see Figure 1).
ONSET presents one such putative constraint. By hypothesis,
the ONSET constraint is abstract, so its effect should be
independent of the articulatory and acoustic demands associated
with the production and perception of specific sounds in a
given context (e.g., in clear speech vs. noise), their modality of
presentation (e.g., they should be active for both spoken and
printed words), and the state of sensorimotor systems (typical
or impaired). Demonstrating that phonological principle P can
be subsumed by sensorimotor constraints would falsify the
hypothesis that P forms part of the core knowledge system of
phonology.
Learnability presents a third critical test of the hypothesis.
A principle P would be falsified if the relevant generalization
were induced from experience with similar forms. For example,
ONSET would be falsified if the preference for pa (over ap)
required experience with syllables like pa, ba, ma, etc. As in the
case of sensorimotor correlates, the role of experience must be
interpreted with caution. And indeed, the (un)learnability of P
does not mean that its acquisition requires no experience at all. It
is trivial to show that, absent some minimal triggering conditions,
language will not emerge normally. Similarly, absent experience
with speech, deaf individuals will develop a sign language, whose
phonology is distinct from that of hearing speakers. Experience,
then, clearly plays a critical role in triggering the unfolding of
the putative phonological phenotype (Berent, 2013a, p. 245). But
triggering should not be confused with the cognitive process of
inductive learning. The triggering condition entails that the pa
preference might require experience with speech, generally. By
contrast, induction means that the pa preference will require
experience with specific types of syllables—ones whose structural
properties overlap with those of the preferred pa type (e.g., labial-
initial syllables, such as pa, ba). The hypothesis that certain
phonological primitives and constraints are innate cognitive
traits (i.e., they arise in the normal course of development, but
do not result from a cognitive process; Samuels, 2004) explains
this fact.
Evaluation of Innateness at the Behavioral,
Genetic and Evolutionary Levels
Our discussion so far shows that the hypothesis of core
knowledge is clearly falsifiable, and I believe Everett and I
agree on the criteria outlined in (1). In his view, however,
the list of methodological requirements for demonstrating core
knowledge is more extensive (see 3). In particular, Everett
imposes restrictions on the range of admissible experimental
methods, and on the genetic and evolutionary conditions for
demonstrating core knowledge. I consider these three objections
in turn.
(3) Everett’s conditions for demonstrating that principle P forms
part of a core knowledge (based on Everett, 2016b, p. 4):
(a) Demonstrate the role of P in infancy by relying on
methods “more sound than babies’ sucking or eye-
movements.”
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(b) “Keep genetics and epigenetics (constraints –
embryological, environmental – on the strength,
absence, or presence of genetic effects) separate.”
(c) Provide a plausible account for the evolution of the trait.
Everett’s first requirement stipulates conditions on the
behavioral methods admissible for demonstrating core
knowledge. In his opinion, the support for core knowledge
cannot be based on measures involving sucking or eye
movement. This requirement arbitrarily rejects a very large
literature that demonstrates principles of core knowledge in the
first months of life. Everett (2016b) provides no justification for
this requirement. Elsewhere (Everett, 2016a, p. 664), he notes
the concern that the infant “is acting upon information that is
different from the information the researcher is thinking about.”
While Everett is of course, right that the link from behavior to
cognitive structure is indirect, this challenge is certainly not
specific to looking time or sucking methods. Any response to
contrasting stimuli—be it manual button press, looking time or
neural activity—can only be linked to cognitive structure if those
stimuli are matched for all other relevant dimensions. The critical
challenge for making such inferences is the control of stimuli, not
the modality of response. However, Everett does not show that
such controls are lacking in any of the hundreds of studies that
employ this procedure. In fact, none of these experimental results
is reviewed with any detail. In any case, the evidence for core
knowledge in infancy is not limited to looking time or sucking
methods. For example, near infrared spectroscopy shows that the
brain activity of neonates is modulated by the syllable hierarchy
(Gómez et al., 2014). Furthermore, the results from looking time
methods are corroborated by findings from brain measures (cf.,
the evidence for rule learning in behavioral vs. brain measures,
in Marcus et al., 1999 and Gervain et al., 2012). Accordingly, the
exclusion of the great majority of the infant literature on core
knowledge has no justification.
Everett’s next condition requires that one furnish genetic
evidence for core knowledge, and in so doing, one must
“keep genetics and epigenetics (constraints – embryological,
environmental – on the strength, absence, or presence of genetic
effects) separate.” To illustrate the logical difficulties inherent
in the notion of innate knowledge, Everett considers the “pro-
drop” parameter (i.e., optional deletion of the subject, as in “He
left”). By his account, each of the two settings of the parameter
(i.e., whether or not the subject can be dropped) must each
be associated with different genes. Accordingly, if the “pro-
drop” parameter were truly innate, then this knowledge must
be “located somehow, somewhere in the human genome” (p. 2),
and consequently, one would have expected these two settings to
doubly dissociate: some genetic mutations should have selectively
impaired the acquisition of a “pro-drop” language, but spared
a language that lacks the “pro-drop” option; other mutations
should have produced the complementary pattern. However, no
such dissociations are reported. Beyond this empirical challenge,
Everett is concerned that the hypothesis of innate knowledge
presents an inherent contradiction. If knowledge (e.g., the “pro-
drop” parameter) is genetically coded, then it must be subject
to mutations, which would ultimately prevent certain languages
from being learnable. In the case of the “pro-drop” parameter,
Everett would predict that some language learners should be
genetically predisposed toward favoring the “drop” option,
whereas others (those carrying the opposite parameter setting)
should be predisposed toward learning languages that do not
drop their subject. The result is that “not all people may be able to
learn every language” (p. 2). Put differently, if UG is innate, then
it cannot be universal.
However, there are a number of fallacies in this logic. First,
innateness and universality are not an oxymoron. Humans
are innately equipped with two eyes, yet this trait does not
become abruptly extinct (i.e., non-universal) in the population
by sudden spontaneous mutations. This is because innate traits
are buffered by homeostatic mechanisms that seek to detect
and correct replication errors in the genome, as well as cell
and tissue malfunctions during embryonic development. These
checks and balances are not infallible. Accordingly, rare genetic
abnormalities or developmental problems (like the loss of
particular cell types or interference from external factors that
embryos can be exposed to, such as alcohol, nicotine, synthetic
steroid hormones, etc.) could prevent the typical acquisition of
universal grammar, just as they can result in a single “cyclopean”
eye in human fetuses (Sarnat et al., 2014). Such rare cases of
dysfunction do not throw into question the reality of the complex
sequence of developmental events that forms the innate basis of
the “two eyes” trait and its universality in the normal population.
The same holds for universal grammar.
Similarly, there is no biological reason that distinct settings
of a UG principle (e.g., “pro-drop”) must doubly dissociate.
Everett predicts such dissociations because he believes that
distinct innate principles (e.g., the two settings of the “pro-
drop” parameter) must be “localized” in distinct bits of DNA.
But this requirement is based on a misunderstanding of the
relation between genotypes and phenotypes. Core knowledge
(e.g., UG) concerns properties of the cognitive phenotype—the
putative set of cognitive principles that are somehow represented
in the brains of individual speakers; this is not conceptually
identical to the genotype of these individuals (e.g., their particular
sequences of DNA bases), nor are genotypes and phenotypes
necessarily related in a one-to-one fashion. By hypothesis, the
tendency of humans to converge on a cognitive phenotypic
trait is constrained by their genome, but the links between the
phenotype and genotype are complex. For example, the “blue
eye” and “brown eye” phenotypes are not expressed on distinct
genes; rather, eye color is a complex genetic trait that is linked
to multiple single nucleotide polymorphisms that do not sum
up in a linear, additive fashion (e.g., Liu et al., 2009). Likewise,
the expression of innate traits is inextricably linked to epigenetic
factors (Ridley, 2003) as well as chance events (Balaban, 2006).
Language (e.g., the “pro-drop” parameter) is unlikely to form an
exception.
None of the above, however, means that the hypothesis of
(innate) core knowledge is vacuous or untestable. Rather, these
facts remind us that innateness is a multifaceted problem that
can be evaluated at different levels of analysis. Genetics and the
cognitive sciences represent two very different levels. Critically, it
is both unreasonable and biologically unrealistic to expect direct,
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one-to-one mapping across these levels (Balaban, 2006). The
problem of collapsing across levels of analysis is hardly unique
to the cognitive sciences. Chemical reactions, for instance, attain
different explanations in the fields of physics and chemistry,
and it is impossible to reduce one level of analysis to the other
(Chomsky, 2014). In short, scientific hypotheses can be evaluated
only at the level of analysis to which they apply (Fodor and
Pylyshyn, 1988; Samuels, 2004; Chomsky, 2014; see also Berent,
2013a; Embick and Poeppel, 2015), and in the case of core
knowledge, this is squarely within the cognitive level. Everett
would be entirely right to expect cognitive scientists to separate
the role of innate principles and learning at the cognitive level.
However, it does not follow that each cognitive trait will be
transparently mapped to distinct bits of DNA, irrespective of
epigenetic factors. Everett’s insistence on “locating” UG principles
in the genome and “separating genetics from epigenetics” is a red
herring, rooted in the erroneous conflation of the cognitive and
genetic levels of analysis.
Everett’s final condition, his demand for a complete
evolutionary history of core knowledge, is another such
diversionary tactic. Everett is of course right to urge us to explore
the evolution of core (phonological) knowledge—a question
Berent (2013a) examines by conducting an in-depth analysis
of the precursors of phonological principles in non-humans
(see Chapter 10). But a detailed evolutionary history is by no
means a logical prerequisite for establishing that core knowledge
exists. To reiterate, the core knowledge hypothesis is first a claim
concerning the synchronic cognitive state of individual speakers.
We now turn to evaluating the empirical evidence for its support
in the case of phonology.
A CASE STUDY: THE RESTRICTIONS ON
SYLLABLE STRUCTURE
The Phonological Mind examines the origins of phonological
primitives and constraints by reviewing the empirical evidence in
multiple case studies using a broad interdisciplinary perspective,
informed by linguistic analysis, behavioral experiments with
adults and children, and neuroimaging studies. In most of
these cases, the conclusions are unclear—a fact that I openly
acknowledge (contrary to Everett’s assertions). One such case,
however, has been the subject of systematic investigation that
directly pits the UG account against various non-linguistic
explanations (per the requirements in 1a-c above). Accordingly,
this case features prominently in Berent (2013a) and it forms
the center of Everett’s (2016b) critique. I will first describe the
linguistic phenomenon at hand and the experimental evidence,
and then consider Everett’s objections.
The Linguistic Phenomenon
Across languages, certain syllable types are systematically
preferred to others. Syllables like bla, with stop-liquid onsets, are
preferred (e.g., more frequent) relative to bna (i.e., stop-nasal
combinations), which, in turn, are preferred to bda (two stops);
least preferred are syllables like lba (i.e., liquid-stop sequences);
together those preferences give rise to a syllable hierarchy (see 4).
Such preferences have been documented statistically in the
distribution of these syllables in language surveys (Greenberg,
1978; Berent et al., 2007), so their existence is well established.
The question is whether those facts reflect linguistic principles
that are active universally, in the grammar of every individual
speaker.
(4) The syllable hierarchy: blif>bnif>bdif>lbif
Everett strategically diverts the discussion of this cognitive
question by plunging into a technical linguistic controversy
concerning one formal analysis of this phenomenon, the sonority
sequencing generalization (SSG, for definition, see Box 1; see
also Saussure, 1915/1959; Vennemann, 1972; Hooper, 1976;
Kiparsky, 1979; Steriade, 1982; Selkirk, 1984; Clements, 1990;
Gouskova, 2001; de Lacy, 2004; Smolensky, 2006; Zec, 2007).
In so doing, he hopes to discredit the hypothesis that the
syllable hierarchy is universal. Everett asserts that sonority is
a circular concept that is devoid of phonetic basis, and he
marshals a number of challenges to this analysis. But many of
these challenges are erroneous (see Box 1). His exposition of
the linguistic literature (based on Ohala’s seminal work from the
Ohala, 1990) ignores more recent developments in phonetics
(Parker, 2002) and phonology (e.g., Parker, 2012, and chapters
therein). Furthermore, Everett overlooks the fact that the SSG
correctly generates additional predictions regarding several other
syllable hierarchies (see 6), and these predictions are borne out
by both linguistic and experimental evidence (e.g., Berent et al.,
2009, 2010, 2011b, 2012a; Lennertz and Berent, 2015; Tamasi and
Berent, 2015).
While there is much evidence to suggest that the SSG merits
careful consideration, it is important to keep in mind that
the SSG and the syllable hierarchy are not one and the same.
The syllable hierarchy is a hypothesis concerning speakers’
grammatical preferences; the SSG presents a particular account
of the formal mechanisms that give rise to these preferences.
Other formal accounts, however, can capture the hierarchy
without appealing to sonority (e.g., Smolensky, 2006, and its
discussion in Berent, 2013a, pp. 172–174). So even if the SSG
should turn out to be wrong (a question that is still very much
open), the syllable hierarchy could still remain viable. It is the
syllable hierarchy, then, not the SSG, that is the topic of our
discussion. We now turn to examining the relevant experimental
evidence.
The Experimental Evidence
My colleagues and I have examined the hypothesis that the
syllable hierarchy (as in 4), as well as the related hierarchies (see 6)
is the product of universal grammatical constraints (Berent et al.,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011a,b, 2012a, 2013b, 2014, 2015; Gómez
et al., 2014; Lennertz and Berent, 2015; Tamasi and Berent, 2015;
Zhao and Berent, 2015).
Our research program proceeds in two steps. First, we ask
whether speakers are sensitive to the structure of syllables that
they have never heard before. For example, do English speakers
favor bnif to bdif, and bdif to lbif despite the fact that none of
these syllable types exists in their language? To the extent that
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BOX 1 | Everett’s critique of sonority.
An influential account of the syllable hierarchy appeals to sonority. Sonority is an abstract phonological property that correlates with the loudness of phonological
elements (Clements, 1990; Zec, 2007; Parker, 2008, 2012). On a basic sonority scale (Clements, 1990), the most sonorous (e.g., loudest) consonants are glides (e.g.,
w, y; with a sonority (s) of 4), followed by liquids (e.g., l, r; s = 3), nasals (e.g., m, n; s = 2) and obstruents (e.g., b, p; s = 1). Using these levels, one can calculate the
sonority distance in the onset by subtracting the sonority level of the first onset consonant from that of the second (1s = s2-s1, see 5). Accordingly, syllables like bla
exhibit a large rise in sonority (s = 12) and bna exhibits a smaller rise (1s = 1), whereas lba exhibits sonority fall (12 = −2). Indeed, as the sonority cline decreases,
the syllable becomes underrepresented across languages (Berent et al., 2007). Thus, blif, for instance, is more frequent than bnif, which is more frequent than bdif;
least frequent are syllables like lbif.
(5) The sonority distance in complex onsets
S1 S2 1s
bl 1 3 2
bn 1 2 1
bd 1 1 0
lb 3 1 −2
This observation is captured by a constraint on syllable structure known as the sonority sequencing generalization (SSG). The SSG states that onsets must
rise in sonority, whereas codas must exhibit a sonority fall. A related principle, the minimal sonority distance, states that languages restrict the minimal sonority
distance they allow; English, for instance, requires a rise of at least two steps, so it allows syllables like bla (1s = 2), but bans syllables like bda (1s = 0). Smolensky
(2006) further shows that the preference for syllables with large sonority distances can be traced to putatively universal constraints.
Everett amasses several challenges to the SSG; some are justified, but most are not. For example, Everett notes that the sonority hierarchy does not explain the
ban on English syllables such as bwa, or account for the aversion to syllables like /ji/ across languages. However, these observations are fully in line with the SSG.
Considering the English ban on bwa, Everett is right to note that the SSG should render such a syllable well formed in English (as its sonority distance, 1s = 2, is
comparable to twin, for instance). However, this does not show that the SSG is wrong. Indeed, no single phonological constraint can single-handedly capture the
entire phonology. In the case of bwa, its avoidance is due to an independently motivated constraint that bans adjacent identical features (i.e., the adjacent labials in
bwa, which are banned by the Obligatory Contour Principle, McCarthy, 1994), so this fact has no bearing on the SSG. The second observation—the aversion to /ji/
across language—actually follows from the SSG. Because these glide-vowel sequences exhibit a minimal sonority rise, they are expected to be dispreferred. These
facts present an embarrassment to Everett’s linguistic analysis, not to the SSG.
Other facts (e.g., the allowance of English syllables like spot), however, are known counterexamples to the SSG. Since English typically requires its syllables to
exhibit a rise of two steps in sonority, plateaus such as spot should have been unattested. While this fact is amenable to a formal explanation (Selkirk, 1982), s-initial
onsets present a systematic counter-example to the sonority hierarchy in many languages, and, contrary to Everett’s accusations, I have openly acknowledged these
challenges in print (Berent et al., 2007; Berent, 2013a, p. 167).
(6) Other syllable hierarchies predicted by the SSG:
(a) mla>mda
(b) fsa>fta
These challenges notwithstanding, the concept of sonority is still attractive because it generates a number of correct predictions regarding several other hierarchies.
For example, the sonority hierarchy correctly predicts a preference for nasal-sonorant over nasal-stop onsets (e.g., for mlif over mdif ). Similarly, a more detailed (and
independently motivated, Steriade, 1982) sonority scale that renders fricatives more sonorous than stops predicts a preference for fsik (a fricative-fricative onset, i.e.,
a sonority plateau) over ftik (a fricative-stop onset, i.e., a very small fall in sonority). These results are borne out by experimental evidence (e.g., Berent et al., 2009,
2010, 2011b, 2012a; Lennertz and Berent, 2015; Tamasi and Berent, 2015). For reasons of space, my discussion of the sonority hierarchy focuses only on the
stop-sonorant sequence in (1), but these other hierarchies should be kept in mind.
such preferences are detected, we next examine whether they
result from universal grammatical constraints, or from various
non-grammatical sources—auditory, articulatory, or lexical.
(7) Testing the syllable hierarchy:
(a) Ill-formed syllables are systematically misidentified—
the worse formed the syllable, the more likely its
misidentification.
(b) The misidentification of ill-formed syllables is
inexplicable by non-grammatical sources, including:
(i) Auditory/phonetic failure
(ii) Articulatory difficulty
(iii) Similarity to familiar syllables
To infer people’s preferences, we exploit the phenomenon of
grammatical repair. We reason that, if all grammars universally
encode the syllable hierarchy, then ill-formed syllables will
not be represented faithfully. Instead, ill-formed syllables
(e.g., lbif ) will be recoded (i.e., repaired) by the grammar
as better-formed syllables (e.g., as lebif ). Repair, then, can
potentially provide a litmus test for the ill-formedness of a
syllable. And if ill-formedness depends on the syllable hierarchy,
then this hierarchy should determine the likelihood of repair—
the worse formed the syllable, the more likely its repair,
hence, its misidentification. These predictions are borne out by
numerous studies with speakers of various languages. Figure 2
summarizes results from speakers of English (Berent et al.,
2007), Spanish (Berent et al., 2012b) and Korean (Berent et al.,
2008).
Obviously, misidentification can also emerge from many other
sources (see Figure 3). In particular, syllables like lbif could
be misidentified because people fail to extract their phonetic
form from the auditory signal (Davidson and Shaw, 2012;
Wilson et al., 2014). Similarly, syllables like lbif might exert
greater articulatory demands. Given the known links between
speech perception and articulatory action (Fadiga et al., 2002;
Pulvermüller et al., 2006), the misidentification of lbif in
perception could result from difficulties in its covert production
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FIGURE 2 | The effect of the syllable hierarchy on responses to
monosyllables by speakers of English, Spanish, and Korean.
Participants in this task indicate whether the auditory input has one syllable or
two. Results show that worse-formed syllables elicit more errors. Error bars
are confidence intervals for the difference between the means. Data from
Experiment 1 in Berent et al. (2007, 2008, 2012b).
FIGURE 3 | Potential sources of misidentification. According to the
phonological account, ill-formed syllables (e.g., lba) are misidentified because
they are repaired by the grammar due to their violation of universal
grammatical constraints. Misidentification, in this view, is due to phonological
repair, occurring during phonological encoding. However, by alternative
accounts, misidentification results from the dissimilarity of the input to the
lexicon, or difficulties in its phonetic encoding, due to failure either to extract
its auditory/phonetic form, or to covertly simulate its articulation.
(Redford, 2008). Finally, it is conceivable that the syllable
hierarchy in (4) is encoded in the phonological grammar of
some speakers due to experience with similar syllables in their
language (e.g., Daland et al., 2011). Accordingly, the attribution of
misidentification to core knowledge of phonology (i.e., UG) can
only be done by elimination—after rejecting non-phonological
(acoustic and articulatory) and inductive sources, as indicated in
(1) above.
My colleagues and I have addressed each of these alternative
explanations in turn. Contrary to the phonetic/auditory
explanation, we found that ill-formed syllables do not present
greater processing cost under conditions that promote
attention to the phonetic properties of the stimuli (e.g.,
Berent et al., 2007, Experiments 5–6; Berent et al., 2012a).
This finding challenges the assertion that such syllables
are misidentified because they are harder to encode at the
phonetic/auditory level. Furthermore, the (phonological)
difficulties in processing ill-formed syllables persist when
the stimuli are presented in print—in the absence of any
phonetic/auditory demands whatsoever (see Figure 4A; Berent,
2008; Berent et al., 2009; Berent and Lennertz, 2010; Tamasi and
Berent, 2015).
Our results are likewise inconsistent with an articulatory
explanation. If the difficulties in processing ill-formed syllables
result from difficulty in their subvocal articulation, then
procedures that suppress the articulatory motor system should
attenuate the disadvantage of ill-formed syllables. Contrary to the
articulatory account, however, we found that ill-formed syllables
are misidentified even when articulation is suppressed—either
mechanically, by having participants bite on tongue depressors
(Zhao, 2015), or electromagnetically, by disrupting the lip motor
area in the brain using transcranial magnetic stimulation (Berent
et al., 2015). Additional evidence for an abstract grammatical
locus of repair is presented by neurological patients, whose
repair of onset clusters in production is demonstrably distinct
from sensorimotor pressures (Buchwald et al., 2007; Buchwald,
2009; Cohen-Goldberg et al., 2013; Miozzo and Buchwald,
2013).
Finally, several studies counter the lexical analogy
explanation—the possibility that bnif is preferred solely for
its similarity to sniff, for instance. We find that sensitivity to
the syllable hierarchy obtains even in languages that arguably
lack complex onsets of any type (for Korean see Berent et al.,
2008; for Mandarin Chinese, Zhao and Berent, 2015), and even
in the absence of any lexicon at all—among neonates (Gómez
et al., 2014, see Figure 4). These findings from neonates agree
with the outcomes from an imaging study with adults (Berent
et al., 2014) showing that ill-formed syllables elicit a monotonic
increase in the activation of the posterior part of Broca’s area (BA
45, see Figure 4D). Together, these results suggest that syllable
structure is constrained by abstract grammatical principles that
are broadly shared across languages, possibly universally. The
repair of ill-formed syllables results from their violation.
Everett’s Objections to the Empirical
Findings
Given the large experimental literature that has examined the
syllable hierarchy, one would expect a critique to scrutinize
the experimental logic, methods, statistical analysis or results
of specific studies. However, Everett (2016a,b) cites none of
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FIGURE 4 | Continued
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FIGURE 4 | Continued
Tests of non-grammatical explanations for the misidentification of ill-formed syllables. (A) Sensitivity to the syllable hierarchy with printed materials.
In this task, people make identity judgment (e.g., is lbif = LEBIF?). Results show that, as the syllable becomes worse formed, people take longer to discriminate
monosyllables from their disyllabic counterparts. (B) Sensitivity to the syllable hierarchy despite suppression of the lip motor by TMS. Results show that TMS
attenuates overall discrimination (d′), but it does not diminish the sensitivity to the syllable hierarchy. (C,D) Sensitivity to the syllable hierarchy in neonates. Results
plot the effect of the syllable hierarchy on differences in oxyhemoglobin (red) and deoxyhemoglobin (blue) concentration changes for ill-formed minus well-formed
syllables, contrasting either (C) sonority rises and falls (e.g., blif vs. lbif ) or (D) sonority rises and plateaus (e.g., blif vs. bdif ) at four regions of interest (superior and
inferior at the left and right hemisphere; ∗ indicates significant differences, p < 0.05). (E) The effect of the syllable hierarchy on the posterior part of Broca’s area: as
the syllable becomes ill-formed, activation increases (data from Berent et al., 2014).
those primary sources. In fact, he hardly acknowledges that
any of these studies has even attempted to address any non-
grammatical explanation for the results. Instead, his exposition
reduces the experimental logic ad ridiculum to the following: if
people misidentify lbif, ergo, the SSG is an instinct.
Patient readers must endure the bulk of his critique to learn
that the actual rationale guiding the experimental investigation
is far more nuanced, and those non-phonological (and non-
universal) sources for the syllable hierarchy have been carefully
considered and evaluated experimentally. Even then, however,
Everett’s description hardly does justice to the research program
as a whole. For example, he briefly acknowledges that the syllable
hierarchy has been replicated in silent reading (contrary to
the auditory/phonetic account), but then immediately moves to
dismiss these results on grounds that “we know too little about the
relationship between speaking and reading” (Everett, 2016b, p. 7).
These alleged gaps, however, do not stop Everett from offering an
original reading theory of his own (Everett, 2016b, pp. 7–8; italics
mine):
...in looking at new words speakers often try to create the phonology
in their heads and so this “silent pronunciation” could guide such
speakers’ choices, etc. Everyone (modulo pathology) has roughly
the same ears matched to roughly the same vocal apparatus. Thus
although phonologies can grammaticalize violations of functionally
preferable phonotactic constraints, one would expect that in
experiments that clearly dissociate the experimental data from the
speaker’s own language, the functionality of the structures, e.g.,
being auditorily easier to distinguish, will emerge as decisive factors,
accounting for speakers’ reactions to non-native sequences that
respect or violate sonority sequencing, etc. In fact, there is a name
for this, though with a somewhat different emphasis, in Optimality
Theoretic Phonology (Prince and Smolensky, 1993/2004; McCarthy
and Prince, 1994) – the “emergence of the unmarked.”
This passage is striking for various reasons. First, it is puzzling
to see the liberty Everett takes in dismissing the huge literature
on reading, which suggests (based on behavioral results and
evidence from neuroimaging) that speakers are acutely sensitive
to the phonological structure of printed words (for reviews:
Perfetti, 1985; Van Orden et al., 1990; Berent and Perfetti, 1995).
Reading, to be sure, is not the only experimental literature to be
singlehandedly rejected by Everett—recall that he also dismisses
the entire infancy literature of sucking/looking time. This is
a peculiar move from a serious scholar who is committed to
“empirical adequacy.”
Moving to Everett’s own reading theory, it is unclear how,
in this proposal, auditory constraints come to shape speakers’
behavior. Surely, people cannot possibly misidentify the printed
word lbif because this stimulus imposes excessive auditory
demands; perhaps Everett is suggesting that people estimate the
demands auditory stimuli might impose, and use this estimate to
inform their judgments. However, there is no evidence that such
a mechanism exists, let alone that it can estimate the demands of
unfamiliar stimuli. Either way, misidentification, by this account,
would reflect the outcome of a process that estimates the demands
on speech perception, not a perceptual mechanism (auditory or
phonetic). Alternatively, perhaps the syllable hierarchy reflects
principles that are inferred on the fly. Everett implies that a single
encounter with an unfamiliar stimulus results in the emergence
of phonological constraints, a phenomenon he attributes to the
The Emergence of the Unmarked (referring to a central outcome
of Optimality theory, McCarthy and Prince, 1994). But The
Emergence of the Unmarked (at least according to McCarthy and
Prince, 1994) is due to innate, universal grammatical constraints,
not auditory difficulties. And if such constraints were active, then
this would support the UG account, rather than disprove it.
In any case, the existing experimental evidence against
the auditory account is not limited to findings from printed
materials. Other results show that, when prompted to attend
to phonetic detail, people do not necessarily experience greater
difficulties with ill-formed syllables (Berent et al., 2007, 2012a).
Likewise, individuals with dyslexia, whose auditory and phonetic
systems are demonstrably impaired, exhibit intact sensitivity
to the syllable hierarchy (Berent et al., 2013b, 2016). These
two sets of results are important because they suggest that
the misidentification of ill-formed syllables is rooted in the
phonological, rather than the phonetic or auditory systems.
Summary
Everett’s critique centers on a specific formal analysis of the
syllable hierarchy (SSG), not the evidence for the hierarchy itself,
and for the most part, his formal objections are erroneous.
His only objection to the experimental findings is based on an
incoherent model of silent reading for which there is no support.
I thus conclude that Everett’s attack on the syllable hierarchy is
unfounded.
OTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE
PHONOLOGICAL MIND THESIS
Anticipating the shortcomings of his own attack on the syllable
hierarchy, Everett declares that even if the SSG were to
be replaced by more adequate formal principles, the “core
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knowledge” hypothesis would still crumble. This is because
“the evidence she (IB) provides for an instinct fails no matter
what principle she might appeal to” (p. 7). In support of this
assertion, Everett submits that all other hallmarks (actual or
presumed) of core knowledge in phonology need not arise
from any innate universal principles. Specifically, he asserts
that algebraic rules can be learned from experience, and
that the properties of phonological systems (unique shared
design, early onset, and spontaneous regenesis) can all be
traced to sensorimotor, rather than phonological pressures. The
regenesis of signed phonological systems, in Everett’s view, is
irrelevant to spoken phonology, and the early onset of spoken
phonology simply reflects rapid learning. Finally, scaffolding
(the propensity of phonological systems to give rise to reading)
is simultaneously false and non-specific to phonology. Once
again, however, Everett’s anti-nativist fervor clouds some critical
scientific nuances.
(8) Other evidence against core knowledge of phonology:
(a) Algebraic rules are learned from experience.
(b) The unique, shared design of phonological systems,
their early onset in development and their spontaneous
regenesis are all explained by sensorimotor pressures, not
principles specific to phonology.
(c) Regenesis establishes a false analogy between signed and
spoken phonology.
(d) The early onset of phonology reflects early learning.
(e) Scaffolding is both false and not specific to phonology.
Everett’s attack on algebraic rules conflates two very different
hypotheses about (a) the computational properties of linguistic
rules (i.e., the algebraic hypothesis) and (b) the origins of some
rules (i.e., the Universal Grammar hypothesis), which together
form the thesis of The Phonological Mind (see 9).
(9) The Phonological Mind thesis:
(a) The algebraic hypothesis (Computation): The phono-
logical grammar consists of algebraic rules.
(b) The universal grammar hypothesis (Origins): Some
grammatical primitives and constraints are innate.
The algebraic hypothesis asserts that phonological principles
apply over abstract categories (e.g., “consonant”) rather than
their members (e.g., the consonant b or k), such that all
category members are treated alike (i.e., they form equivalence
classes). Furthermore, the grammar encompasses mechanisms
that operate over entire categories using variables (e.g., X,
standing for “any consonant”) and, consequently, grammatical
rules can encode abstract relations among categories (e.g.,
identity, recursion). For example, the ∗XXY rule (where X
and Y stand for any two consonants) bans any XXY form,
that is, any tri-consonantal structure with identical consonants
at its beginning, regardless of whether these consonants are
familiar or novel. The hypothesis that some grammatical rules
are innate (i.e., the universal grammar hypothesis) is a second
hypothesis that is logically distinct from the algebraic hypothesis.
Everett attacks the algebraic hypothesis because algebraic rules,
such as the Semitic ban on XXY stems (Greenberg, 1950), are
learned in many cognitive domains. However, the algebraic
hypothesis makes no claims about the innateness of any
particular phonological rule or its domain specificity. Everett’s
attack confounds the algebraic and UG claims.
The algebraic hypothesis is critical for two reasons. First,
it explains productivity—the capacity of the grammar to
generalize phonological principles across the board, to any
member of a class (e.g., even to non-native consonants).
Second, it allows one to draw a principled distinction between
the (algebraic) phonological grammar, and the (non-algebraic,
analog) phonetic and sensorimotor systems (see Figure 1).
This distinction becomes particularly significant in light of
Everett’s subsequent argument that phonological pressures are
sensorimotor. Obviously, if phonological systems were to directly
reflect analog sensorimotor pressures, then, ipso facto, such
systems could not possibly be phonological (i.e., algebraic); they
would be sensorimotor. Nonetheless, Everett is right to note
that many phonological principles “conspire” to favor structures
that optimize sensorimotor pressures. The Phonological Mind
captures both the distinction between these two systems
(phonology and the sensorimotor system) as well as their
convergence. The distinction between the phonology and the
sensorimotor systems is explained by the hypothesis that the
two systems are distinct, and they differ in their computational
properties. Their convergence is explained by the hypothesis
that sensorimotor pressures shape the design of the phonological
system in phylogeny (Berent, 2013a,b, see Figure 1). To reiterate,
the correlation between phonology and sensorimotor pressures
does not necessarily mean causation affecting on-line, language
processing.
The hypothesis that some phonological principles are both
algebraic (i.e., abstract and amodal) and innate would explain the
capacity of phonological systems to emerge spontaneously in a
new linguistic modality, in nascent sign language (i.e., regenesis:
see 8c, e.g., Sandler et al., 2011; Brentari et al., 2012; Coppola and
Brentari, 2014). The same hypothesis would also account for the
early emergence of phonology in typical language development.
Everett rejects the evidence from regenesis because “no one
has ever successfully demonstrated that signed languages have
“phonology” in the same sense as spoken languages” (p. 8).
It is unclear what Everett means by “successfully,” as there
is certainly ample research to suggest that significant cross-
modal phonological similarities exist. For example, as with
spoken languages, signers encode syllables and constrain their
internal structure by appealing to their sonority (defined by the
visual salience of phonological features, e.g., Perlmutter, 1992;
Brentari, 1993; Sandler, 1993; Williams and Newman, 2016).
Furthermore, experimental evidence shows that English speakers
spontaneously extend their phonological knowledge of syllable
structure to signs (Berent et al., 2013a). Clearly, phonology is not
confined to spoken languages.
Everett’s next stipulation, that the early onset of phonology
in typical development is entirely due to rapid learning (8d),
is likewise countered by evidence for the syllable hierarchy in
neonates (Gómez et al., 2014). While knowledge seen at birth can
be learned—fetuses are known to extract rhythmical properties of
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their maternal language in utero (e.g., Kisilevsky et al., 2009)—it is
unlikely that such learning would extend to specific consonantal
features. Indeed, infants do not show knowledge of the specific
phonetic contrasts of their mothers’ languages until the end of
their first year of life (e.g., Eimas et al., 1971; Werker and Tees,
1984). The findings of Gómez et al. (2014) do not establish
what principles guide neonates’ preferences (e.g., phonological vs.
phonetic). Nonetheless, neonates’ sensitivity to syllable structure
is likely innate.
Moving to his last point (8e), Everett rejects scaffolding—the
hypothesis innate core knowledge forms the basis for related
bodies of knowledge that are acquired in later development.
For example, the (innate, universal) core knowledge of number
forms the basis for the recursive number system that emerges
optionally in later development. In a similar vein, the putative
innate knowledge of phonology could explain the fact that
mature writing systems tend to encode phonological principles,
and reading tends to recover phonological structure from
print.
Everett objects on grounds that scaffolding is both (a)
not specific to phonology and (b) false, since some writing
systems are hieroglyphic. However, these claims are both self-
contradictory and individually unwarranted. Scaffolding does not
mean that every writing system ever invented is phonological.
Rather, phonology appears to impose a constraint on the
cultural evolution of writing systems, such that mature writing
systems tend to encode phonological units (DeFrancis, 1989),
and readers tend to automatically recover these phonological
representations from print (for discussion, see Perfetti, 1985;
Van Orden et al., 1990; Berent and Perfetti, 1995). Similarly,
Everett’s first objection (“scaffolding is non-unique”) attacks a
straw man. No one claims that scaffolding is a defining feature
(i.e., a necessary and sufficient condition) of core knowledge, so
Everett is right to note that these properties are also found in
systems that are clearly invented by culture (“Burrito-making
has its own unique features,” p. 8). However, while Everett
may admire the unique design of burritos, enthusiasm for this
observation is tempered by the fact that, unlike phonology,
burrito design is neither universal, early nor spontaneously
emerging. The conjunction of these features is suggestive of core
knowledge.
CONCLUSION
Everett is certainly right to question whether phonology is
a system of core knowledge. I applaud his efforts to unveil
the origins of language and his many contributions to the
field. Summarizing the state of research in The Phonological
Mind, I concluded, “While the core phonology proposal seems
to presently offer the best explanation for the wide range of
evidence considered in this book, the available evidence is
insufficient to fully evaluate this hypothesis,” and I proceeded
to indicate a number of open questions for future research
(Berent, 2013a, p. 312). Resolution of these issues will require
a nuanced theoretical analysis followed by careful experimental
scrutiny. Inflammatory statements only hinder the progress of
this enterprise. As Everett puts it, “. . . a spurious observation of
a few phonologists is not likely to serve as an instinct” (Everett,
2016b, p. 6). Neither, by the same token, could such remarks
possibly refute this hypothesis.
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